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In the past decade or two, we have all become acutely aware of the impor-
tance of strong financial markets and particularly of their crucial impor-
tance for sustained economic growth. As a result of the lessons we have all
learned in recent years, considerable progress has been made in strength-
ening financial markets in emerging economies. But much remains to be
done, and the currently benign global environment is exactly the right time
to press ahead with further reforms.
The importance of the opportunity aﬀorded by the favorable present
conjuncture is not to be underestimated. Reforms introduced in such cir-
cumstances have many advantages and a better prospect of long-term suc-
cess. They can be properly thought through, rather than, as is the case at
times of crisis, introduced hastily and with an increased risk that mistakes
will be made in either the formulation or the implementation. Reforms in-
troduced in an upturn also have fewer adjustment costs and, in general,
face less opposition. Adjustment is more easily absorbed in the context of
growth.
In this chapter I want to examine some of the lessons we learned during
the financial crises of the 1990s. I want particularly to focus on what we
learned about the close relationship between financial markets and the
macroeconomic environment that provides the framework for rapid and
sustained economic growth—and the rise in living standards and reduc-
tion in poverty that growth makes possible. And I want to comment on the
way the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is ready to help its member
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countries to undertake and implement reforms, especially those in the fi-
nancial sector.
8.1 The Role of the Financial Sector
We have long known about the importance of the financial sector in 
supporting economic growth. As economies grow more sophisticated, an
eﬃcient banking and financial system becomes increasingly important in
helping to ensure the allocation of scarce resources in an eﬃcient manner.
When economic activity is at its most basic and is carried out within a
confined geographical area, bartering and, in time, the reliance of family
finance to provide limited capital for investment might suﬃce. But as pro-
ductive activities increase, reliance on family finance soon starts to inhibit
growth. More financial intermediation is needed if economic activity is to
reach its productive potential because of constraints otherwise imposed on
the growth of more profitable activities (especially when small). Banking
comes to play a greater role in increasing resources for high-return activi-
ties and reducing the amount wasted in lower return ones. As economic 
activity becomes more sophisticated and complex—a consequence of
growth—so the banking and financial system becomes more important.
Banks need to grow in order to meet the demand for investment capital.
And at the same time they need to develop their ability to assess risk and
creditworthiness.
Without banks able to assess risk, creditworthiness, and potential rates
of return, resources are allocated ineﬃciently, and growth is slower than
would otherwise be the case. The banking system performs a crucial role in
the early stages of economic growth by making credit available to the po-
tentially most productive sectors of the economy. It allocates—or ought to
allocate—much of the increment in resources available for investment.
And this allocation does a great deal to determine the growth rate of the
economy as a whole.
As the economy grows, and also grows more complex, the financial sec-
tor needs to keep pace. Banks need to grow and become more sophisticated
in their ability to assess prospects for returns; risk; and to allocate re-
sources eﬃciently; and, in parallel, there needs to be the development of
other financial sources of investment capital. Sustained and rapid growth
needs to be underpinned by a broadening and deepening of the financial
sector, capable of serving the needs of agriculture, industry, and services.
The breadth and depth of financial markets becomes ever more important
as growth accelerates. High growth rates are only attainable and sustain-
able if they are supported by a strong and eﬃcient financial sector. The
economies that have sustained rapid growth over the long term are those
whose financial sectors have become increasingly sophisticated, complex,
and adaptable as the economy grows.
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This was certainly the history of the industrialized countries. As they
grew in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, their financial
systems grew in depth and breadth. In the nineteenth century, London
achieved its status as the world’s leading financial center because it had de-
veloped rapidly in order to serve the needs of British industry and British
exporters. As it grew in order to support Britain’s economic growth, it 
also became a major contributor to that growth—and, for that matter, to
growth in other parts of the world as it exported capital and financial skills.
In the twentieth century, New York played a similar role in relation to the
American economy. As New York developed as a financial center to serve
the needs of the dynamic and rapidly growing American economy, so it de-
veloped skills and services that could themselves be exported.
And this process has continued. As the industrial economies have grown
ever more complex, so their financial sectors have continued to develop in
order the meet the changing needs of the economies that they serve. The
growth of hedge funds in recent years is an example of this continuing de-
velopment in financial markets. And as the financial sector in industrial
countries has become more complex, it has posed fresh challenges for
those charged with ensuring that the financial sector is sound and well
functioning.
Even twenty or thirty years ago, no one would have quarreled with what
I have just said. Ronald McKinnon, my Stanford colleague, wrote of “fi-
nancial repression” and its costs in terms of foregone growth in the 1970s.
But the financial crises of the 1990s brought home to all of us an in-
creased understanding of the importance of the financial system and its
smooth functioning. What we had perhaps not fully appreciated was the
extent to which the health and eﬀectiveness of the financial sector was
bound up with the performance of the economy as a whole. It took a series
of crises in emerging market countries to enable us to understand more
about the linkages between the financial sector and the rest of the economy
and their importance.
I want to illustrate my argument by examining the extent to which fail-
ings in the financial sector contributed to the Korean crisis of 1997–1998.
8.2 Korea
By the time the Korean financial crisis broke in late 1997, the crises in In-
donesia and Thailand had already occurred. Initially, the Korean crisis
manifested itself as a foreign exchange crisis: capital flows out of Korea
forced the government both to float the won and to raise interest rates in
order to stem the outflows. That, in turn, exposed the degree to which Ko-
rean firms and banks had a mismatch between their assets (in won) and lia-
bilities (many of which were denominated in foreign exchange). The prin-
cipal source of Korea’s problems lay in the low and falling rates of return
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of the Chaebol, the large conglomerates that were so important to the
economy and, hence, of the banking system. These low rates of return were
a consequence of credit rationing in earlier years that in turn had led to an
overreliance on debt financing for business investment.
For most of the three decades following the start of Korea’s reform pro-
gram in the 1960s, this Asian tiger was the example that other developing
countries sought to emulate. It is hard to remember that what is today the
world’s eleventh largest economy and one of the richest economies in Asia
was, in the 1950s, one of the poorest in the world and the third poorest in
Asia. Many economists and policymakers believed at the time that this was
an economy that could never be viable without sustained transfers of for-
eign aid.
Yet the reforms introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s had a re-
markable—and remarkably swift—impact. Korea’s growth record is daz-
zling even with hindsight. Real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an
average of 10 percent a year in the ten years from 1963. By the mid-1990s,
real per capita income was close to nine times what it had been in the early
1960s.
The thrust of the reform program was to turn Korea into an open econ-
omy, with a consistent and single-minded focus on exports. In 1960, at the
start of the reforms, Korean exports accounted for 3 percent of GDP and
imports for 13 percent of GDP. By 1970, the export share of GDP had risen
to 14 percent, and by 1980 it stood at 33 percent. Between 1959 and 1969,
exports and export earnings grew at an annual average rate of 41 percent.
The Chaebol played a central role in this spectacular export perfor-
mance. The Chaebol were conglomerates, usually family-owned, that grew
rapidly as a result of the reforms introduced from the early 1960s that pro-
vided strong incentives for exporters. The Chaebols’ success in exporting
was aided by government policies that allocated low interest toward suc-
cessful exporters, gave exporters tax breaks, and provided a realistic ex-
change rate. As companies grew rapidly and expanded, access to credit was
vital: and this was made available on the basis of their export performance. 
It is important to remember that the export incentives on oﬀer were uni-
form, available to any that increased exports: they were not geared specif-
ically toward the Chaebol. Rather, the Chaebol were those firms, or con-
glomerates, that grew most rapidly and were exporters. For much of the
three decades or so of spectacular Korean growth, the Chaebol were na-
tional heroes—they were seen as spearheading the remarkably successful
growth performance, itself understood to be the result of opening up the
economy.
Trade was liberalized at an early stage in the Korean reform process, but
in the early years, the banking system was tightly controlled. Credit ra-
tioning according to preset criteria—predominantly export performance—
continued well beyond the mid-1960s. The real interest charged on these
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loans was positive but below the market-clearing rate. Deregulation of in-
terest rates only started in the late 1980s.
At the outset of the reforms, rationed credit financed a very large part of
investment, and that credit enabled more rapid expansion of exporting
companies than would have been possible if companies had relied on rein-
vested profits. It also ensured very high rates of return: in the first decade,
the Chaebol enjoyed rates of return estimated at 35 percent or more—so
high that most Chaebol would have borrowed even more, had they been
able to. Of course, these high rates of return resulted from the allocation of
resources to exportables, earlier seriously underdeveloped.
But over the next three decades, as growth and investment continued,
these rates of return fell, as indeed they should have. The real interest rate
charged on loans rose, and the gap between the controlled rate and the
market-clearing rate narrowed.
By the 1980s, the rates of return were slightly lower for the Chaebol than
for Korean manufacturing firms as a whole. By the latter part of that
decade, rates of return in Korea were, on average, slightly above 4 percent;
they fell to under 2 percent in the early 1990s and were negative by 1997.
This is in marked contrast to rates of return in the United States, which
were higher and more sustained, and with Japan, where even after falling
after the Asian crisis were still 2.3 percent.
The Chaebol continued to increase in importance relative to the economy
as a whole, as credit continued to be allocated to them, with dangerous con-
sequences. From the mid-1980s, the largest thirty, and the largest five Chae-
bol, were growing at around 20 to 30 percent annually. By the time of the cri-
sis in 1997, their assets were many times higher than they had been in 1985
(fourteen times for the largest thirty and nineteen times for the Big five). By
1997, the Big Five Chaebol firms accounted for about 40 percent of manu-
facturing sector assets. But the close links between firms in a Chaebol in-
cluded investing in each other and guaranteeing bank debt for each other
and, indeed, borrowing from some banks owned by the same Chaebol.
Because of the history of credit rationing and the reliance on debt fi-
nance, Korean firms were highly leveraged. Firms in the manufacturing
sector had debt equivalent to about three and a half times their equity in
the mid-1990s. This figure declined somewhat in the 1990s, but it was still
around two or three times higher than in the United States. Chaebol firms
were even more highly leveraged than Korean firms as a whole. And they
had strong incentives to continue to rely on debt financing, not least be-
cause the equity market was so small.
The highly leveraged position of the Chaebol had serious implications
for the Korean economy as a whole. Sustaining rapid growth meant pro-
viding a continuing flow of credit to the Chaebol. But as rates of return, of
manufacturing firms and the banks, declined, so maintaining the credit
flow became more diﬃcult.
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Although bank assets rose sharply between 1992 and 1997, net income
had peaked in 1994, and the rate of return on bank assets was falling con-
tinuously, as was the rate of return on equity. Nonperforming loans (NPLs)
had not increased prior to the crisis—although NPLs rose sharply after the
crisis started—but in hindsight that appears to be, at least in part, the re-
sult of “evergreening.” This is the practice by which banks extend new
loans to enable borrowers to avoid default and service old debts. In other
words, the financial health of borrowers was deteriorating before the onset
of the crisis.
Conventional wisdom at the time of the crisis attributed the source of the
trouble to the foreign currency exposure of the banking system. But this
foreign borrowing had been needed to help sustain the rapid credit expan-
sion at home. Foreign borrowing was needed to cover the problem of
(mainly disguised) NPLs at home. The real source of Korea’s problems was
homegrown, as the quality of bank loan portfolios declined.
In a paper I prepared with Jungho Yoo, we described early-1997 Korea
as a disaster waiting to happen. Because of the need to sustain lending to
the Chaebol, the banking system and, ultimately, the economy had become
so vulnerable that any relatively small shock would have been enough to
bring the system to breaking point. The trigger was the foreign exchange
crisis that resulted in the sharp rises in interest rates needed to stem the out-
flow of capital. But it was the rise in interest rates that made debt servicing
impossible for many firms and so ultimately brought the banking system to
its knees. The situation was complicated by the need to restructure the
Chaebol as well as tackling the problems of the banks themselves.
Korea’s painful experience helped bring home to economists and the
policy community the importance of a well-regulated and transparent bank-
ing system—and the damage that can be inflicted on the economy as a
whole by the absence of a healthy financial sector. Tackling the problem 
of nonperforming loans is always challenging for policymakers, as we can
observe from Japan’s long (albeit ultimately successful) eﬀorts to do this.
But NPLs must be easily identifiable by bankers and regulators. Lack of
transparency in the system, which gives bankers an incentive to ignore de-
terioration in the quality of their loan portfolios, can mean that NPLs only
become apparent at a late, and even more dangerous, stage. And attention
to balance sheet soundness, and the degree of open exposures, is crucial.
The events in Korea showed that weaknesses in the financial sector feed
through directly into economic performance. A problem for the banking
system is a problem for the economy as a whole. But this was greatly com-
pounded in Korea’s case by the absence of well-functioning financial mar-
kets beyond the banking system—the lack of eﬃcient bond and equity
markets made the vulnerability of the banking system all the more danger-
ous. Crises and chronic weaknesses in the financial sector lead to low
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growth rates—or, in the worst cases, a contracting economy. Output is lost,
and poverty reduction eﬀorts are halted, at least temporarily.
8.3 Lessons from the 1990s
It is diﬃcult with an open trading economy to have other than a fairly
open capital account. But in the absence of a strong regulatory framework,
there is always a risk that financial deregulation will lead to a lending boom
and create vulnerabilities in the banking system. The rapid expansion of
domestic credit such as occurred in Korea in the 1980s and 1990s is always
dangerous. When credit expands too rapidly, the quality of bank portfolios
declines. Credit allocation becomes increasingly indiscriminate. The abil-
ity to assess risk is severely impaired, not least because the banks will lack
suﬃcient experienced personnel to judge risk properly in a credit boom.
In such a scenario, even a small shock can be suﬃcient to turn many
loans into nonperforming ones. That damages the banking system. But the
too-rapid expansion of credit and the growth of poor quality loans also
hamper economic growth.
A healthy banking sector is crucial. But it should not be the only source
of finance and credit allocation. I noted at the outset that as an economy
grows in size and complexity, the financial sector needs to grow with it. It
must become wider and deeper in order to spread risk and fund high-
quality investment. The more sources of finance and the more sources of
credit—and the greater the competition—the better placed the financial
sector is to assess risk and potential rates of return. The more eﬃcient
credit allocation is, the more likely it is that credit goes to where it will de-
liver the best return, so raising the potential growth rate of the economy as
a whole. The better risk assessment and management, the better credit is
allocated; and the better-regulated the financial sector, the more resilient
the economy as a whole will be to external shocks.
Economies need well-developed bond and equity markets. As firms
grow in size, diversity, and complexity, they need access to credit on the
best terms; they also need access to diﬀerent kinds of finance according to
their needs. The ability to raise longer term finance through equity or se-
curities reduces firms’ reliance on short-term bank finance that might
make long-term investments vulnerable to shifts in interest rates. And citi-
zens and institutions of diﬀerent countries need to be able to hold each
others’ securities. This is a natural part of the process of global economic
integration and can also reduce the concentration of risk in each country
in any one sector. The problems that Korea experienced underline the dan-
gers of overreliance on bank loan finance for investment.
A final lesson pertains to the importance of assessing balance sheet risks.
The severity of the Korean crisis had much to do with the mismatch in cur-
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rency exposure between bank assets (won) and liabilities (more foreign
exchange).
8.4 The Impetus for Reform
So the role of domestic policymakers is clear. A healthy eﬃcient finan-
cial sector is a vital component of economic growth. Putting the necessary
measures in place to ensure the banking system is sound, that nonbank fi-
nancial systems are well managed, and that banks have incentives to iden-
tify both risk in the system and potential rates of return all contribute sig-
nificantly to growth, even in the short term. But such measures bring
significant rewards in the medium and longer term. And as those involved
in the aftermath of the financial crises on the 1990s can attest, financial sec-
tor reform is far more diﬃcult when undertaken in a crisis atmosphere.
Hence my earlier emphasis on the need to push ahead with reforms now,
when change can be implemented in a relatively benign global environ-
ment. It is important for emerging market economies—here in Latin
America as elsewhere—to address remaining vulnerabilities while the out-
look remains favorable. It is not simply a matter of creating a stable macro-
economic framework, important though that is. Reforms need to go be-
yond this and lay the foundations for more rapid and sustained growth.
The aim should be to raise the potential growth rate of an economy. Macro-
economic stability is a prerequisite for this, of course. But it is not enough.
Structural reforms aimed at making economies more flexible and thus ca-
pable of achieving more rapid growth are also essential.
And financial sector reforms are a vital element of these structural re-
forms. The latest issue of Doing Business, published annually by the World
Bank, underlines the importance of financial sector reforms and the contri-
bution they can make to stability and growth. Each issue of Doing Business
assesses individual country performance against a wide range of measures
that create a business-friendly environment. It makes for interesting—and
salutary—reading.
The latest issue has a section entitled “Getting Credit” and illustrates the
links between such factors as legal rights for borrowers and lenders and the
level of nonperforming loans and between the quality of credit information
and the strength of the financial system.
The evidence clearly shows that the more legal rights that borrowers and
lenders enjoy, the lower the level of nonperforming loans a country is likely
to have. As you might expect, many of the industrial countries score highly
on the strength of legal rights index that includes the ability of lenders to
enforce collateral, for instance, as well as the time such enforcement takes.
Out of a possible score of 10, the United Kingdom gets full marks, Aus-
tralia 9, Germany 8, and the United States 7. But Botswana and Albania
also score 9, whereas Italy only manages 3. Latin American countries also
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tend to have low scores: Argentina manages 3, while Brazil and Mexico
only score 2. Many countries elsewhere in the world score 1 or 0.
Strengthening the legal rights of borrowers and lenders is crucial if pro-
ductive investment is not to be stifled. Lenders are understandably reluc-
tant to lend to any but the lowest-risk borrower if they cannot enforce col-
lateral contracts or if such enforcement takes an unreasonable length of
time. Businesses with investment possibilities oﬀering potentially good re-
turns find it hard to obtain credit in such an environment. And credit allo-
cation in an economy with weak legal protection for financial transactions
is likely to be suboptimal at best, with the inevitable consequence that
growth is below potential.
Doing Business also notes a correlation between ratings of financial 
system strength and the presence of private credit bureaus that are seen 
as improving the provision of credit information. The provision of good
credit information—including negative as well as positive information on
would-be borrowers—makes it easier for business to obtain credit because
lenders are more accurately able to assess creditworthiness and risk. Mak-
ing it hard for lenders to obtain information simply penalizes all would-be
borrowers, including those whose creditworthiness is sound and whose
borrowing would bring good returns.
Again, the industrial countries score well on credit bureau coverage. The
United States, Sweden, Ireland, and Canada are among those countries
where credit bureaus cover the entire adult population. Argentina also
scores highly on this measure, with 95 percent coverage. But Brazil and
Paraguay have coverage of barely half the population, while Mexico doesn’t
quite have 50 percent. Chile has 22 percent coverage and Costa Rica less
than 5 percent. More than half the 155 countries surveyed have no private
credit bureau coverage at all.
Reforms are under way in some areas. Brazil, for example, was one of ten
countries in 2004 that made it easier to create and then enforce collateral
agreements, which make access to credit easier for borrowers and provide
better incentives for lenders. Among the others introducing similar re-
forms were India, Japan, Finland, and Croatia—a mixed group that dem-
onstrates that reform is, and ought to be, an ongoing process for all coun-
tries, be they low income, emerging market, or industrial.
8.5 The Role of the IMF
The IMF has an important role to play here. Our central task, according
to our mandate, is the promotion of international financial stability. That
is not meant to be an end in itself, of course. Our Articles of Agreement
make clear that a stable international financial system is a vital ingredient
in promoting the sustained rapid economic growth that brings rising living
standards and poverty reduction. And, as our Articles also emphasize, in-
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ternational financial stability is essential for the expansion of trade that en-
ables rapid growth.
But international financial stability needs sound national financial sys-
tems. So the Fund, in the context of our Article IV and surveillance work,
as well as in our work with program countries, focuses much of its work on
the health of the financial sector. We have introduced new tools, including
the Financial Sector Assessment Program, about which I will say more in
a moment, to help us in this work.
We try to assess financial sector robustness in a variety of ways. We pay
close attention to banks’ balance sheets and the extent of NPLs. We also
examine the extent to which risk is clearly defined in the financial system as
a whole. And we look at the degree of competition within both the bank-
ing system and the financial sector as a whole: competition improves the
eﬃciency of credit allocation, and it also helps diversify financial risk and
cut borrowing costs. We examine issues such as the rate of credit expan-
sion; and we look for mismatched exposures as these are a potential source
of instability.
I noted earlier that the breadth of financial instruments is important, as
is the transparency of the system that enables more accurate assessments
to be made of the asset and risk position of individual institutions. And a
strong, eﬀective regulatory regime, following international best practice, is
vital.
I mentioned the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Intro-
duced in 1999, this is part of the attempt to enhance the Fund’s work in this
area. It is a voluntary program—member countries request an FSAP,
which involves bringing in a team of experts to undertake a detailed exam-
ination of the financial system of the country in question. The work carried
out under an FSAP program involves a broad range of financial experts,
many of them from outside the Fund. Some come with substantial experi-
ence in regulating the financial sector of individual member countries; oth-
ers are involved with international regulatory bodies. Still others have spe-
cific qualifications needed for the tasks involved.
The FSAP program—which the Fund runs jointly with the World Bank
when low-income countries are involved—aims to help member govern-
ments strengthen their financial systems by detecting vulnerabilities in fi-
nancial supervision at an early stage, to identify key areas which need fur-
ther work, to set policy priorities and to provide technical assistance when
this is needed to strengthen supervisory and reporting frameworks. The
end result is intended to ensure that the right processes are in place for
countries to make their own substantive assessments.
Financial sector assessment programs don’t examine the balance sheets
of individual banks, or even the banking sector as a whole. Their purpose
is to help our member countries ensure that an appropriate framework is
in place so that domestic regulators and supervisors are able to make ac-
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curate judgments about the health of the banks and other financial insti-
tutions under their jurisdiction.
A large number and a wide range of our member countries have now had
an FSAP program. The feedback we get is overwhelmingly positive, from
both industrial countries with highly developed financial sectors as well as
others.
The FSAP also forms the basis for Financial Stability Assessments
(FSAs) in which IMF staﬀ address issues related to the Fund’s surveillance
work. These include risks to macroeconomic stability that might come
from the financial sector and the capacity of the sector to absorb shocks. Is
the level of NPLs a cause for concern? Are the banks well regulated and
sound? How would the financial sector be aﬀected by sharp rises in inter-
est rates—would this lead to a rise in NPLs? Again, these FSAs cut across
the full breadth of our membership.
We have also worked with the World Bank to develop a system of Stan-
dards and Codes—using internationally recognized standards—that re-
sult in Reports on Standards and Codes (ROSCs). These cover twelve ar-
eas, including banking supervision, securities regulation, and insurance
supervision. The financial sector ROSCs are an integral part of the FSAP
and are published by agreement with the member country. They are used
to sharpen discussions between the Fund—and, where appropriate, the
World Bank—and national authorities and, in the private sector, including
rating agencies, for risk assessment purposes.
It is perhaps worth noting that some Fund research done a couple of
years ago suggests that there is a tangible payoff—in the form of lower
spreads—for member countries where the Fund has undertaken ROSCs
and where the reports have been published in full. The markets take a fa-
vorable view of this transparency which can translate into lower borrowing
costs.
8.6 Conclusion
For economists and policymakers, the experience of the 1990s taught us
a great deal. Of course, we learned that reliance on fixed exchange rates can
make economies vulnerable in the event of crisis (and most emerging mar-
ket economies have, as a consequence, adjusted their exchange rate re-
gime). We learned that in an increasingly integrated world economy a
strong macroeconomic framework is essential both to make possible more
rapid and sustained growth and to reduce vulnerability to shocks.
But we learned perhaps above all that financial sector soundness is vi-
tal—for its own sake, yes, but also for the health of the economy as a whole.
Weaknesses in the financial sector result in lower growth than would oth-
erwise be possible and make the economy more vulnerable to crises.
Financial sector health depends on a sound regulatory framework, rely-
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ing on incentives, sound banking procedures that permit the proper as-
sessment of risk, and the progressive widening and deepening of the finan-
cial sector to ensure that it continues to meet the needs of the economy.
Like economic policy reform in general, financial sector reform cannot be
a one-oﬀ. It has to be a continuous process, partly to reflect our growing
understanding of the issues and partly to reflect the need for constant
adaptation and refinement in the financial sector and in the economy as a
whole.
Let me emphasize once again that policy made on the hoof in a crisis sit-
uation is always diﬃcult to get right. Reforms forced on the authorities as
they respond to a crisis stand less chance of long-term success because they
are less likely to be well-thought out. But planned reforms implemented in
the context of an expanding national and global economy have lower ad-
justment costs and present fewer political diﬃculties.
Financial market strength is vital in a successful and growing national
economy. It is also vital for the smooth functioning and long-term growth
prospects of the global economy. It is a central part of the economic policy
reform process and, as such, is an important priority for the Fund in its role
of promoting international financial stability and growth.
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